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the outsiDer’s gaze: 
reflections on recent non-byzantinist reaDings of 
byzantine history anD on their Ιmplications for our fielD
My first personal academic engagement with modern non-Byzantinist 
readings of Byzantium came in 20061. In the fall of that year I was asked 
by professor Vassilis Lambropoulos of the University of Michigan to opine 
on Pope Benedict XVI’s discussion of Byzantium in a talk delivered at the 
University of Regensburg2. The Pontiff’s selectively quoted academic paper 
stirred immediate controversy in the world media on account of its perceived 
anti-Muslim slant. Indirectly, Byzantium entered public discourse, used by a 
Pope who quoted a Byzantine emperor’s words to make a very contemporary 
point. This was an exhilarating moment that brought a Byzantinist like 
myself in the world of important modern debates about culture, religion, 
and politics. In a way, the present essay is a continuation of a process of 
engagement with modern readings of Byzantium that started back in 2006. 
It took form as I widened my “narrow” research interests by reading works 
by scholars in fields outside Byzantine studies that, either tangentially or 
more directly, touched upon our field and perhaps affected it. 
1.
 
Many years earlier, as a schoolboy raised in Greece, I was exposed to a very different 
lay take on Byzantine history when I read P. Delta’s Στὸν Καιρὸ τοῦ Βουλγαροκτόνου and 
K. Kyriazis’ Ρωμανὸς Δ΄ Διογένης. Questions regarding the place of Byzantium in modern 
Balkan national narratives are not addressed here. 
2.
 
For access to that paper http://www.lsa.umich.edu/UMICH/modgreek/Home/
Window to Greek Culture/History, Bio, Memoir/HBM_Krallis_Greekreasonregensburg.
pdf. J. P. Arnason, Byzantium and Historical Sociology, in: The Byzantine World, ed. 
P. Stephenson, New York 2012, 491-504 provides a current assessment of the place of 
Byzantine studies in the field of historical sociology, noting the lost opportunity for 
fruitful engagement with our field.
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The Pontiff’s speech was not to be the last time Byzantium was drawn 
into debates about Islam and the West. In an elegant piece published three 
years later, the Berkeley anthropologist Saba Mahmood explored the notion 
of Muslim injury from western depictions of the prophet and in doing so 
discussed the iconophilic theory of schesis as developed by Theodore the 
Stoudite3. Once again, a modern critic seeking to construct an argument 
of distinctly contemporary import selectively appropriated an aspect of 
Byzantine culture in a manner that directly affects her readers’ perspective 
on Byzantine culture. I have dealt with Mahmood’s work in another venue 
and will not therefore further engage with it here4. It is, nevertheless, worth 
mentioning because Mahmood’s is a contribution that operates within most 
“fashionable” (Postsecularist) intellectual company and will consequently 
be read in graduate schools and seminars throughout North America and 
Western Academia in general.
In the present essay I leave post-secularism aside to discuss two other 
works published in the past four years that engage more extensively with 
the history and culture of the Byzantine polity. The first one is Empires 
in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference by Jane Burbank 
and Frederick Cooper and the second: A World Without Islam by Graham 
Fuller. Here I consider the image of Byzantium as it appears in these works 
and ponder on the significance of such perspectives for the reception of 
Byzantium and by extension of Byzantine studies among non-Byzantinist 
audiences, both academic and lay5. Their focus, Empires and Islam, is surely 
compelling and bound to generate interest among readers and reviewers. 
Byzantinists have every reason to follow such work, as it inevitably becomes 
part of a process whereby opinions about our object of study and discipline 
3. S, MahmooD, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide? in: 
Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, ed. T. AsaD, W. Brown, J. Butler, 
S. MahmooD, Berkeley 2009, 64-100.
4. D. Krallis, The Critic’s Byzantine Ploy: Voltairean Confusion: in Postsecularist 
Narratives, boundary 2 40:1 (2013), 223-43.
5. In selecting these two works I am necessarily eschewing engagement with recent uses 
of Byzantium in the realm of popular culture. Here I have in mind works such as the 2012 
Vampire fantasy thriller Byzantium, the Turkish epic movie Fetih 1453 or Julia Kristeva’s 
Murder in Byzantium: A Novel. All these works contribute in their distinct ways in shaping 
opinion about Byzantium in either local or more global contexts, but require distinct 
treatment that I am not ready to offer here.
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are formed in the public realm that affect how readers process our own 
work. Let us then turn to the matter at hand.
In an interconnected world of increasingly diffuse economic power 
and shifting political centers, empires have been making a comeback. For 
more than a decade now scholars have been turning towards these political 
and cultural behemoths in search of models for a post-national world. At 
the same time a quest for examples of non-western political agency spurred 
by the ascent of post-colonial theory and the increasing economic and 
political clout of the so-called BRICs6 – states spanning vast spaces and 
encompassing diverse populations – have created a new market for studies 
of the world’s imperial pasts.
Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, a 
collaborative effort by professors Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, tackles 
a vast subject through a sweeping, truly global synthetic study7. With this well 
written and, undoubtedly, extensively read scholarly contribution Burbank 
and Cooper are poised to shape the debate in classrooms (and newsrooms) 
for years to come. The book has already been widely reviewed and scholars 
in a range of different fields will have to deal with the consequences, both 
salubrious and negative of its academic impact.
EiWH is divided in fourteen chapters and develops its theme over 511 
pages that take us from the days of Rome and ancient China to our new 
perhaps once again Chinese century. Here I approach this work from the 
perspective of Byzantine studies, commenting more generally on the authors’ 
assumptions, propositions, and overall discussion of Roman, Byzantine, 
Islamic and Ottoman history as covered in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 5 (1. Imperial 
Trajectories, 2. Imperial Rule in Rome and China, 3. After Rome: Empire, 
Christianity and Islam, 5. Beyond the Mediterranean: Ottoman and Spanish 
Empires). 
Synthetic works such as EiWH inevitably generalize, offering schematic 
and for that reason sometimes-distorting views of the past. It is thus with 
an eye on the authors’ engagement with Byzantine scholarship that I turn 
to EiWH in order to address what I think are flaws in its conception of 
Byzantium, the world around it, and the current state of the field. EiWH’s 
6. BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China.
7. J. burbanK – F. Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of 
Difference, Princeton NJ 2009, henceforth EiWH in the body of the text.
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weaknesses are not simply a function of its authors’ lack of specialization in 
things Byzantine. They are perhaps, most ominously, a reflection of the way 
in which scholars outside our field digest our work. In this sense then, my 
reading is also a reflection on Byzantinists’ collective failures in “knowledge 
translation”.
On his personal page on the NYU website Cooper notes: “I wish to 
get beyond the excessive focus on the nation-state in the scholarship of 
recent years toward a fuller analysis of the range of ways in which people 
imagined collective futures and the range of institutional mechanisms 
which constrained and stimulated the fulfillment of those possibilities”. 
EiWH in many ways represents a fulfillment of this ambition. In fact the 
“collective futures” imagined by imperial subjects and the “institutional 
mechanisms” devised to achieve the said goals guide Burbank and Cooper’s 
study of empires and shape the historical vocabulary employed in their work. 
“Imperial intermediaries” deploying “repertoires and technologies of power” 
to generate and perpetuate “imperial imaginaries” underpin all efforts at 
maintaining effective regimes of resource exploitation8.
The problem with this approach lies in the flattening effects of such 
elegant vocabulary, as the categories invented by B&C occlude differences 
between diverse social, political, economic and cultural phenomena. This 
is more or less inevitable in a synthetic work of rather immense scope, 
yet combined with B&C’s lack of engagement with and, one suspects, lack 
of exposure to the main directions of current scholarship in Roman and 
Byzantine studies, it leads to serious misunderstandings, occlusions, and 
ultimately distortions of the subject matter.
We start with Chapter 2, which focuses on imperial Rome and early 
China, assessing for the purposes of this essay EiWH’s treatment of Roman 
history. Central to the book’s analysis of Roman imperial history is a tension 
between the underlying assumption that “empires preserve distinction” (p. 
14) and the authors’ admission that Rome’s rule was rendered possible by 
“a large-scale, differentiated, and productive economy, extensive networks 
of material and personal connections, and successful ideological outreach” 
(p. 34) that “attracted and compelled the subjects’ loyalty,” while remaining 
8. Ironically the discussion of “intermediaries,” “repertoires,” “technologies of power” 
and “imperial imaginaries” at times occludes the materialist agendas underpinning many an 
imperial project.
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“open to talent” (p. 28) and able to “absorb and inflect” other people (p. 37). 
Nowhere in EiWH is this tension explicated. What is more, the notion of a 
system organized around policies that create and perpetuate distinctions is 
further undermined by the authors’ admission that in the third century the 
constitutio antoniniana took pre-existing impulses to a natural conclusion 
by granting citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire.
EiWH, therefore, stumbles upon the complicated and still contested 
problem of Romanization. There is in chapter 2 little reflection on the 
relevant literature from Woolf (who is actually cited in the suggested 
bibliography), Macmullen, Hingley, and Mattingly, to Swain, Elsner, Ando 
and others. The lack of understanding of the state of the field on the issue 
of Romanization is only coupled by a commensurate lack of engagement 
with the third century crisis, which is only presented as an outcrop of “the 
openness of the system” and of “multiple legitimizing strategies,” (p. 34) 
a generic explanation that melds well with the equally generic notion that 
“Rome did not so much fail as disaggregate itself, as emperors split the 
realm and barbarian warriors took the lead as military servitors of Rome 
and as conquerors of Roman spaces” (p. 41). This voluntarist approach to 
imperial decline has a basis on scholarship as B&C’s reference to Wolfram 
suggests9. It is unclear, however, how very different conclusions in the work 
of Ward-Perkins (also cited in their suggested readings), inflected, if at all, 
their understanding of the times10. One suspects that his interpretation of 
events as well as others more recent, such as the one developed in Heather’s 
Empires and Barbarians, simply do not fit with EiWH’s general drift, that 
treats the fall of empires as a failure to effectively manage “repertoires of 
power”.
At the opening of Chapter 3 (After Rome: Empire, Christianity, and 
Islam) the authors explain that they “explore a major innovation in the 
history of empires: the linkage of imperial power and monotheism” (p. 61). 
One would want to follow the processes that turn a persecuted religion 
into “a tool of empire,” yet EiWH cannot provide an answer, not having 
discussed Christianity’s pre-Constantinian history11. A future edition of 
9. H. Wolfram, The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples, Berkeley 1997.
10. B. WarD perKins, The Fall of the Roman Empire and the End of Civilization, 
Oxford 2005.
11. The idea that Christian monotheism’s tendency towards intolerance may have older, 
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the book would benefit from Stephenson’s elegant summation of scholarly 
consensus on this issue in his recent book on Constantine12. The problem, 
however, is more fundamental, as the very idea of monotheism as a tool of 
empire converts B&C’s discussion of Byzantium (and then Islam) into a 
critique, given that in their minds the turn to Christianity “undermined the 
empire’s capacity for synthetic absorption of different people” (p. 41).
In a schema where monotheism is bound to create fissures it is impossible 
to explain how a Monophysite Saint’s life in Syria can feature the anti-
Monophysite emperor Maurice as its hero, or how, overwhelming evidence 
from across Monophysite (and frequently non-Greek speaking) Syria points 
towards solid commitment of religiously-persecuted and ethnically distinct 
populations to the idea of Rome13. Sixth century Near East, but also the 
empire of the Middle Byzantine era, when Paulician armies fought for 
Orthodox emperors and when iconoclast rulers persecuted populations of 
iconophiles, who nevertheless maintained their allegiance to Constantinople, 
put to the test EiWH’s reading of the effects of Monotheism on the Roman 
body politic. Here the recent volume on Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era by 
Leslie Brubaker and John Haldon, with its new reading of the phenomenon 
of iconoclasm, offers an essential corrective to EiWH’s thesis.
By arguing, therefore, without proper signposting, that Byzantium slowly 
became “a commonwealth of peoples linked by history and religious culture, 
subject to varying degrees of political control from the centre” (p. 66), B&C 
leave the reader wondering if it is Garth Fowden’ Empire to Commonwealth 
or Dimitri Obolensky’s influential yet flawed Byzantine Commonwealth 
that one should be reading for further elaboration on this laconic sentence14. 
Moreover, the diluted sense of authority implicit in the aforementioned 
conceptualizations of a Roman or Byzantine “commonwealth” indicates 
rather Roman roots is not addressed. For that see P. AthanassiaDi, Vers la pensée unique: la 
montée de l’intolérance dans l’Antiquité tardive, Paris 2010.
12. P. Stephenson, Constantine: Unconquered Emperor, Christian Victor, London 
2009, 13-61. Any summation of works on Constantine tends to become dated very fast. 
Timothy Barnes’ Constantine: Dynasty, Religion and Power in the Later Roman Empire and 
Ray Van Dam’s Remembering Constantine at the Milvian Bridge attest to this fact.
13. M. Whittow, The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, London 1996, 44-45.
14. G. FowDen, Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late 
Antiquity, Princeton, NJ 1994; D. ObolensKy, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern 
Europe, 500-1453, London 1974.
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that B&C have not looked at Kaldellis’ suggestion that the citizens of the 
middle Byzantine State may have in fact constituted a nation of Rhomaioi 
that more often than not fought against the other members of exactly such 
commonwealth15.
Given that B&C see in monotheism an imperfect “technology of power”, 
its nefarious effects have to be detected in other instances of Byzantine 
history. Here, once again, lack of engagement with current scholarly debates 
mars their discussion of the “schism” of 1054, which according to them 
“turned out to be definitive” (p. 66). The work of Tia Kolbaba on this event 
does not register in their analysis, and neither do they seem to have actually 
read Herrin’s careful treatment of this issue in a book featured in their 
suggested bibliography16.
And yet ironically, the same authors who treat “monotheism” as a 
problematic component of the Byzantine “repertoire of power” herald the 
reign of Justinian as the “glory days of the empire” (p. 63). They thus offer 
as a model Byzantine ruler a persecuting emperor, who brought ruin upon 
thousands if not millions of heterodox Roman subjects, by streamlining 
under the central control of an increasingly Christian administration civic 
structures, cultural practices, and even the law17.
If B&C fail to grasp the significance and place of religion in 
the eastern Roman state, their understanding of Constantine’s other 
15. A. KalDellis, From Rome to New Rome, From Empire to Nation State: Reopening the 
Question of Byzantium’s Roman Identity, in: Two Romes: Rome and Constantinople in Late 
Antiquity, ed. L. Grig – G. Kelly, Oxford 2012, 387-404; IDem, Hellenism in Byzantium: The 
Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition, Cambridge 
2007, 42-119, specifically 74 ff. C. Raffensperger, Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus’ in the 
Medieval World, Cambridge, MA 2012 for a comprehensive critique of Obolensky’s thesis.
16. T. Kolbaba, 1054 Revisited: Response to Ryder, BMGS 35 (2011), 38-44; eaDem, 
The Legacy of Humbert and Cerularius: The Tradition of ‘The Schism of 1054’ in Byzantine 
Texts and Manuscripts of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in: Porphyrogenita: Essays in 
Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, ed. J. ChrysostomiDes – Ch. DenDrinos, Aldershot 2003, 
47-61; J. Herrin, Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire, Princeton, NJ 2009, 
45-47.
17. P. AthanasiaDi, Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of 
Damascius, JHS 113 (1993), 19-21 and A. KalDellis, Procopius of Caesarea: Tyranny, 
History, and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity, Philadelphia 2004, on Justinian’s persecutory 
politics; S. Mitchell, A history of the Later Roman Empire: AD 284-641, Oxford 2007, 125-
27 for an easily digestible summary of problems with Justinian’s reign.
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monumental decision, of moving the capital to the east is similarly flawed. 
According to EiWH, Constantine perhaps “wanted to assert his autonomy 
from leading Roman families”, when he poured the empire’s resources to 
the vast new building site of Byzantium. That Rome’s emperors had for 
years lived in alternative imperial capitals, from Latin-speaking Trier and 
Salona to Greek-speaking Thessalonike and Nikomedia, undermines the 
idea of Rome’s centrality in the fourth century and helps put the emperor’s 
migration towards the east into perspective.
Another category devised by B&C with an eye to effective generalization 
is that of the “imperial intermediary”; a member of the subject populations 
that assumes a privileged position in the imperial body politic as a go-
between that spans the distance between the rulers and the conquered. 
Members of the local elites with knowledge of local conditions were co-opted 
by the imperial overlords and tasked with the running of the empire’s more 
distant lands (pp. 13-14). While the category could probably be effectively 
applied to a reading of the first two centuries of Imperial Rome’s rule over 
the Mediterranean, things become more complicated by the third century 
and later in the Byzantine era proper.
The concept of the “imperial intermediary” collapses in the Byzantine 
era, as it is not clear what role such men had in a state that “was present 
in the daily practices and imaginations of people” (p. 67). Since B&C have 
not discussed those developments, that in the course of the third and early 
fourth centuries led to the foundation of this new intrusive Byzantine state, 
through Diocletian’s expansion of the empire’s bureaucracy, the reader has 
every reason to ask what it was that led to the disappearance of regional 
players. Once again by not countenancing the possibility of a unitary identity 
binding imperial subjects into something more than comfortable submission 
to a distant imperial power, the authors remain aloof from fruitful recent 
debates on identity formation in the Christianized Roman east18.
If vague and overly formulaic engagement with central questions in 
Byzantine history mars what should have been an important contribution 
to the study of empires, a failure to get basic facts of Byzantine social, 
economic, and cultural history right, leads to further distortion. Thus 
18. KalDellis, Hellenism in Byzantium and IDem, From Rome to New Rome on the 
one hand, and on the other: G. Page, Being Byzantine: Greek Identity Before the Ottomans, 
1200-1420, Cambridge 2008.
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the Themata were not “pathway between the tax-funded army inherited 
from Rome and reliance on aristocrats with their retainers as in most 
of post-Roman western Europe” (p. 67), the seventh century demise of 
urban culture did not give rise to stronger “vernacular cultures” (p. 68) 
within the empire’s boundaries, rather leading to a homogenization of 
Byzantine identity into a nearly national Romanitas, while the Byzantines 
only reluctantly and late in the empire’s history let others – namely the 
Venetians – “do much of the work of exchange and transport” (pp. 68-69). 
Furthermore, the subordination of the coloni to Byzantine landlords was 
not behind the consolidation by the eighth century of a landed aristocracy – 
two hundred years earlier than normally assumed by Byzantine scholarship, 
stone houses were not a universal Byzantine phenomenon and certainly not 
unproblematic evidence of affluence, while prosperous monasteries could 
be evidence of state malfunction (as argued for example by Attaleiates and 
Psellos) rather than proof of “the economic advantages of Byzantium’s 
multiribbed imperial umbrella” (p. 69).
Then, as we enter EiWH’s discussion of Islam, we stumble upon an 
inexcusable act of cultural erasure that may represent a clumsy response to 
Sylvain Gouguenheim’s Aristote au Mont Saint-Michel: Les racines grecques 
de l’Europe Chrétienne. Here B&C note that “much of what ‘the west’ 
knows of Greek philosophy and literature came from Arabic translations, 
later retranslated in Latin” (p. 79). Students of the Italian Renaissance who 
recognize the names of Bessarion, Chrysoloras, and Giovanni Aurispa will 
certainly object, while recent work on the imprint of Byzantine classicism 
on the Greek Canon, offers much needed course adjustment19.
We should perhaps add a few more pieces to our critique. In discussing 
Harun al- Rashid’s famous gift-elephant in their account of Charlemagne’s 
reign B&C argue that “this was as close as Byzantine, Islamic, and 
Carolingian rulers came to acknowledging that they were part of a world of 
empires, interacting with and setting limits on each other, despite claims to 
each represent God’s rule on earth” (p. 86). Nicholas Mystikos’ 10th century 
correspondence with the Caliph and his reference to the twin authorities of 
19. A. KalDellis, The Byzantine Role in the Making of the Corpus of Classical 
Greek Historiography: A Preliminary Investigation, JHS 132 (2012), 71-85; IDem, Classical 
Scholarship in Twelfth-Century Byzantium, in: Medieval Greek Commentaries on the 
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. C. Barber and D. JenKins, Leiden and Boston 2009, 1-43.
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the Romans and the Saracens as equivalents of the Sun and the Moon, fails 
to make it into a book on empires, let alone in the chapter on monotheism. 
Byzantine court protocol, with its clear ranking of foreign ambassadors 
according to their place in the international “food chain”, also eludes B&C’s 
attention even though it attests activity on much travelled imperial horizons. 
Equally absent is any reference to the fascinating intellectual cold war that 
was waged during the ninth-century at the margins of violent conflict20.
Furthermore, certain “technologies of power” treated as an almost 
exclusive attribute of one empire, could just as easily be applied to the 
other. When B&C note that “Ties of religion and kinship – among Jews, 
Armenians, Greeks, and others – offered mechanisms for transmitting 
information and credit, as well as trust, across great distances, over 
long stretches of time, and where the interface with other groups was 
uncertain”, (p. 133) one is justified in thinking that they have in mind the 
Cairo Geniza documents and the lively networks of Jewish exchange active 
in the Byzantine Empire21. That is not, however, the case as Byzantium 
has already been shown to willingly relinquish its trade to the Venetians. 
The sentence quoted here instead describes the Ottoman Empire and its 
“Recombinant Eurasian Pathways” (p. 129). Given the power packed in a 
good turn of phrase, let alone an elegantly written narrative account, the 
reader inevitably associates Byzantium with the rigid, divisive politics of 
monotheism – easily condemned by modern sensitivities – while equating 
the Ottoman Empire with multiethnic trade networks rendered familiar to 
modern minds through the vocabulary of genetics and neuroscience.
Given the general tenor of B&C’s argument, the instances when EiWH 
offers insightful, if by no means original, analysis only reinforce the sense 
that the parts of the book on Rome, its successors, and the Ottomans were 
written as the authors sought to leave behind them material with which 
they were less than comfortable. Thus in discussing the Crusades B&C note 
that “Crusading allowed this Knightly class (particularly younger sons) the 
chance to escape obligations, prove themselves, impress superiors, dispense 
20. M. MccormicK, Origins of the European Economy: Communications and 
Commerce AD300-900, Cambridge 2001, 174-210 on diplomacy between Byzantium, the 
Carolingians, and the Muslim world; D. Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture:The Graeco-
Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ‛Abbāsid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th 
C.), London 1998, 83-95 for cultural anti-Byzantinism in diplomatic contexts.
21. J. Holo, Byzantine Jewry in the Mediterranean Economy, Cambridge 2009, 19.
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patronage, and find – away from the limitations nearer to home – places to 
raid, establish new domains, and justify a place of honor within the terms 
of Medieval Christianity” (pp. 88-89). Here EiWH correctly distinguishes 
religious from other types of motives and shows that B&C can treat 
monotheism as a less than all-encompassing phenomenon. Crusaders exist 
in a Christian society and carve political, social, and personal autonomy 
within Christian spaces. It is curious, why the courtesy of such a reading is 
reserved for western holy warriors and is not extended to Byzantium.
EiWH sums the Byzantine experience with the following lines: “That 
makes for a run of 1100 years for the empire of Constantinople – not bad for a 
polity often regarded as an overcomplicated archaism. Byzantium’s diversity, 
administrative flexibility, and grand ritual presence had transformed earlier 
traditions into a loose fitting, impressive, sometimes frayed, but long-lasting 
imperial robe. Without the durability and adaptability of this empire on 
the eastern Mediterranean, world history would have taken a different 
course” (p. 70). This is undoubtedly well written and visually allusive, 
especially since only five pages prior the reader has been regaled with an 
image of Justinian from the famous San Vitale frescoes. Yet, one cannot 
but sense discomfort in the authors’ comment. The loose-fitting frayed robe 
is not unlike Nikephoros Phokas’ worn imperial regalia in Luidprand of 
Cremona’s caricature of Byzantine court ceremonial. Like everything that 
has preceded it in EiWH, the concluding remark offers opinion wrapped in 
visual evocations that perpetuate stereotypical readings of Byzantium.
We must turn then to a rather different, equally stereotypical take 
on Byzantine history. A World Without Islam is no anti Muslim screed22. 
Author Graham Fuller, former vice chairman of the National Defense 
Council in the CIA with a career at the RAND corporation, occasional 
contributor to the New York Times and a man with a good knowledge of 
the Middle East and Turkey, is not a neo-conservative critic of Islam. His 
book, already reviewed by the prestigious Foreign Policy journal, is in fact 
an attempt to extract Islam from a new modern bi-polarity that juxtaposes 
the West to a monolithic, undifferentiated Islam. He is not a scholar in 
Islamic, Near Eastern, or even Byzantine Studies, and yet his work is read 
broadly given his credentials and his peculiar status as an anti-imperialist 
ex member of the CIA. When he embarks, however, on his task as an author 
22. G. Fuller, A World Without Islam, New York 2010.
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he does terrific injustice to Byzantium by means of a peculiar substitution 
of the “West versus Islam” binary for an older, more persistent, and deep 
rooted one: “Orthodoxy versus the West”. 
In Fuller’s analysis, the schism of 1054, the sack of Constantinople in 
1204, and modern Russian anti-western attitudes are all rooted in “eastern” 
orthodox suspicions of the west23. In his work the key that unlocks much of 
the argument is offered to the reader early on: “Frictions among religions and 
their followers are rarely based on specific theological differences but rather 
on their political and social implications”. (p. 30) Furthermore, “all these 
doctrinal struggles were [linked] to the politics of empire. Power invariably 
attracts religion, and religion attracts power. Theology is secondary” (p. 
23). Even more conclusively the foundation of distinct religious communities 
may hinge little upon theology and a great deal upon secular rivalry” (p. 12).
Byzantinists may argue either side of these positions as they have 
indeed done so over the years. The problem is that this form of power 
politics analysis ends up being based on a geo-determinism that appears 
to seamlessly link ancient and medieval history with the modern world. 
Furthermore, Fuller does not start with Byzantium to explain the Russian 
phenomenon but rather imposes existing conditions and what he knows of 
modern Russia upon his reading of the past. Following a line of analysis 
that borrows much from Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory 
it constructs an immutable East-West divide and places Byzantium firmly 
on the eastern side of the ledger. Thus, according to Fuller, “without Islam, 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity would likely have remained the dominant 
faith of the Middle East down to today” (p. 22). The reader might ask: 
“which Eastern Orthodox Christianity” are we speaking of? Fuller describes 
Constantinopolitan rule as incompatible with eastern Monophysite 
Christianity (p. 82). The implication here is that Constantinople represents 
a Western Christianity inimical to Near Eastern traditions. Then again, 
Constantinopolitan primacy in the east, as established by Chalcedon, is 
described as a strengthening of the east’s resistance towards Western Rome 
(p. 82). Which is it? Is Constantinople Eastern or Western24? 
23. Fuller remains, nevertheless, as confused as Burbank and Cooper when it comes to 
an interpretation of the schism of 1054.
24. In that sense the Pontiff’s address at Regensburg explored a far more fascinating 
binary, as he effected a bridging of the Catholic and Orthodox positions in both theological 
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We see, moreover, that in Fuller’s argument the origins of modern 
divides can be sought in an era before Christianity. In the description of 
Syria’s position in the Byzantine world Fuller will argue: “It had been a 
shaky outpost for the eastward projection of Greek culture against other 
powerful Semitic and Persian cultures in the region” (p.79). The reader will 
ask here: how shaky is an outpost that remains strong for 900 years, from 
the days of Alexander to the rise of Islam? Furthermore, where does Greek 
culture fit? What do we make of the aristocrats of Dura Europos and of 
Lucian of Samosata25? Is Greek culture per se western or do we see Greeks 
slowly turn oriental as they align themselves with Constantinople and join 
their Modern heirs in a diachronic orthodox camp predisposed towards 
hostility for the west26?
In this context of immutable east – west divides, Fuller suggests that 
“The Orthodox Church has maintained its remove from involvement in 
political affairs ever since the fall of Constantinople, and of the three faiths 
is probably the most ‘otherworldly’ and most subservient to the state. It has 
avoided becoming heavily involved in political and social agendas. A Middle 
East still under Orthodoxy today would perhaps have been more conservative 
on political and social issues than Latin Christianity or Islam” (p.124). 
There is much that needs unpacking in this statement, which is perhaps 
emblematic of the greatest misconceptions present in Fuller’s work. If the 
Church remained uninvolved in politics after the fall of Constantinople – a 
claim that would be challenged by the inhabitants of contemporary Orthodox 
countries – then one would perhaps argue that before 1453 the Church was 
in fact involved in politics. The conservative nature of Orthodoxy posited 
in the final sentence of the excerpt above is predicated on immutability that 
is not supported by the divide that Fuller accepts when he uses the fall of 
Constantinople as a historical marker. Furthermore, no Byzantinist would 
accept without serious qualifications the notion of a church uninvolved 
and philosophical terms, leaving on the other side of the divide the forces of reform, both 
Christian and Muslim. For the pope’s address see: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-
regensburg_en.html.
25. For attempts at answering this fascinating question see J. Elsner, Cultural Resistance 
and the Visual Image: The Case of Dura Europos, Classical Philology 96.3 (2001), 269-304; 
N. J. AnDraDe, Syrian Identity in the Greco-Roman World, Forthcoming - Cambridge 2013.
26. See note 10.
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in politics, or for that matter of a Church subservient to the state. As for 
‘otherworldliness’, this may once again come from a projection backwards 
towards Byzantium of modern readings of a mystical Russian orthodoxy as 
imagined by Dostoevsky. It may aptly describe aspects of Palamist theology 
but not much else that one would associate with a Byzantine religious 
experience27.
What are we to take from the confusion that marks Fuller’s work? An 
era of 1100 years is presented as an undifferentiated monolith, its culture 
subsumed by larger geo-cultural exigencies. Byzantium’s Greco-Roman, 
some would say Western, nature is ignored as an “otherworldly orthodoxy” 
colours the reader’s view of Byzantium and ties its history not with its 
Roman past but with Russia’s modern strategic ambitions. As they put these 
two books down on their desks, Byzantinists may scratch their heads in 
disbelief and still the question remains: what is it about our field that allows 
outsiders to so easily Orientalize and fundamentally distort its subject 
matter? According to Burbank and Cooper, Byzantium’s main contribution 
is monotheism. Fuller, on his part, posits a dogged Orthodox resistance to 
the West that is itself never really defined or historically explained. To Saba 
Mahmood Byzantium is all about an emotive theology and Aristotelian 
justifications of a modern Muslim sense of injury. Francis Fukuyama, on 
the other hand, simply ignores Byzantium. He thus omits from his analysis 
of The Origins of the Political Order the one centralized, Roman law-ruled, 
bureaucratic polity of the European Middle Ages28. On every occasion, when 
27. L. Neville, Heroes and Romans in Twelfth-Century Byzantium: The Material for 
History of Nikephoros Bryennios, Cambridge 2012, 112-20; A. KalDellis, The Kalends in 
Byzantium, 400-1200 AD: A New Interpretation, Archiv für Religionsgeschichte 13 (2012), 
187-203; IDem, A Byzantine Argument for the Equivalence of All Religions: Michael Attaleiates 
on Ancient and Modern Romans, International Journal of the Classical Tradition 14 (2007), 
1-22 for recent readings of Roman and Greek inflected Byzantine attitudes vis-à-vis religion.
28. F. FuKuyama, The Origins of the Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the 
French Revolution, New York 2011. Fukuyama’s omission is based on misunderstandings of 
Greek and Roman social and economic formation that become evident in small segments of 
his text. See page 68 for complete confusion on the function of private property in ancient 
Greece and Rome. Fukuyama also appears determined to deal with longue durée. Thus China 
is presented as the inventor of the modern bureaucracy (p.78) ostensibly because it is still 
around and will be the subject of distinct chapters of the book. Byzantium once again has 
no place in this analysis, even though the “younger” Mamluk and Ottoman bureaucracies 
are discussed. It is perhaps easier to understand Fukuyama’s omissions if we see them in the 
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not erased, a Byzantium is produced in a manner that fits well with modern 
agendas, and completely sidesteps scholarship produced in our field.
In Fifty Key Thinkers on History published in 2008 by Routledge, 
the list of historians starts with Herodotos, Thucydides, and Polybios only 
to then jump by way of Livy and Tacitus to Gregory of Tours, Bede, Ibn 
Khaldoun, Froisart and Christine de Pizan on its way to Braudel, Hobsbawm, 
Foucault and Hayden White. One may argue that canons of this sort should 
be ignored in our post-structuralist era. Yet, deplore them as we may, such 
canons still inform public education and shape the consciousness of even the 
most deconstructive mind. That not a single Byzantine historian or for that 
matter Byzantinist (Gibbon of course is there) made the cut, is a reflection 
on our collective failure to stake a claim for our field’s subject matter. 
This is no exercise in self-flagellation. Excellent scholarship is produced 
every year in our field, covering all aspects be they cultural, political, 
economic, social and artistic of the Byzantine experience. Yet if asked, our 
colleagues in other fields will be hard pressed to name a monograph, or for 
that matter an article, from the kaleidoscopic array of sub-disciplines that 
constitute Byzantine Studies, that contributes in ground-breaking fashion 
to theoretical debates on identity, state-formation, and the economy while 
convincingly situating Byzantium at the very center of global intellectual 
trends. Josiah Ober and Victor Davis Hanson, to name but two scholars with 
a very different academic pedigrees and positions on the political spectrum, 
are part of modern debates on politics and war. Martha Nussbaum does 
pretty much the same from the vantage point of classical philosophy. And 
yet when Byzantium reaches a broader audience it is usually because an 
outsider manages the feat, as in the recent case of Kristeva with her novel 
Murder in Byzantium and Luttwak with his flawed but by now widely 
reviewed and read The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire29.
How, then, will we make our work relevant to outsiders? How will 
we shape perceptions of Byzantium, its history, and culture from within 
Byzantine studies? How will we make sure that two eminent historians of the 
modern world, a well-known critic and a respected theorist will do a much 
context of other works of historical sociology. Recent work, for example, has discussed the 
Weberian snub of Byzantium (Arnason, Byzantium and Historical Sociology, 493-94).
29. E. LuttwaK, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, MA 2009; A. 
KalDellis, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2010.01.49 for a comprehensive review of this work.
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better job the next time they engage with our field of study? A corrective 
is urgent if Byzantium and Byzantine studies are to maintain a coherent 
presence in the imaginations of young students, future scholars, and the 
public at large. B&C’s account, even Fuller’s misguided effort, is evidence 
that there is a place for Byzantine studies in important modern debates. It 
is, however, for us to help our colleagues from different disciplines better 
navigate our fields of expertise. Much as the weaknesses in their work are 
not solely theirs, the benefits from such correction would also be collective.
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the outsiDer’s gaze: 
reflections on recent non-byzantinist reaDings of 
byzantine history anD on their Ιmplications for our fielD
The present essay reviews recent work on Byzantium, its politics, religion, 
and culture published outside the world of Byzantine Studies and discusses 
the significance of such readings for the evolving relationship of our field 
with audiences both lay and academic.
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